|
Frank Cikutovich:
Cases
|
Buffelen Woodworking v. Hendershot, 119 Wash.App.
1048 (Wash.App.Div.3 12/16/2003)
| [1] |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Division
Three Panel Four
|
| [2] |
No. 20999-7-III
|
| [3] |
2003.WA.0001830
|
| [4] |
December 16, 2003
|
| [5] |
BUFFELEN WOODWORKING, RESPONDENT,
v.
DAVID HENDERSHOT, APPELLANT, STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, DEFENDANT.
|
| [6] |
SOURCE OF APPEAL Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County
Docket No: 01-2-02946-5 Judgment or order under review Date
filed: 03/11/2002
|
| [7] |
Counsel OF Record
|
| [8] |
Counsel for Appellant(s) Frank Louis
Cikutovich Stiley & Cikutovich
1408 W Broadway Ave Spokane, WA 99201-1902
|
| [9] |
Counsel for Defendant(s) Gervais Ward III McAuliffe Ofc
of Attorney General 1116 W Riverside Ave Spokane, WA 99201-1106
|
| [10] |
Counsel for Respondent(s) D. Jeffrey Burnham Johnson Graffe
Keay Moniz & Wick Llp 925 4th Ave Ste 2300 Seattle, WA 98104
|
| [11] |
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Schultheis, J.
|
| [12] |
Concurring: Dennis J. Sweeney, Kenneth H. Kato
|
| [13] |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
|
| [14] |
David Hendershot, an employee of Buffelen Woodworking, appeals
the court's order on reconsideration regarding his industrial
insurance claim. He contends the Spokane County Superior Court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the employer's
appeal after a favorable ruling regarding his industrial insurance
claim. This opinion was stayed pending the outcome of a Supreme
Court case, Dougherty v. Department of Labor and Industries,
150 Wn.2d 310, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003), which is determinative to
our decision in this appeal. The Dougherty court determined
the requirements regarding the location of the proper court
in which to file an appeal from a decision of the Board of Industrial
Insurance Appeals, as set forth in RCW 51.52.110, relate to
venue, not jurisdiction. Id. at 313. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court's order on reconsideration, which had the effect
of denying Mr. Hendershot's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. We also grant Buffelen's motion to strike
Mr. Hendershot's response brief.
|
| [15] |
Facts
|
| [16] |
In August 1985, while working at Buffelen, Mr. Hendershot
sustained an injury to his lumbar spine. He filed an industrial
insurance claim with Buffelen, who was self-insured. The claim
was accepted and Buffelen provided benefits during the periods
of time Mr. Hendershot was unable to work. Buffelen also paid
Mr. Hendershot's medical expenses. Buffelen closed the claim
in December 1992, with Mr. Hendershot receiving a permanent
partial disability award for low back impairment. In August
1998, Mr. Hendershot filed an application to reopen his claim,
which was denied by Buffelen. Approximately one year later,
the Department of Labor and Industries ordered Buffelen to reopen
Mr. Hendershot's claim. Buffelen appealed the decision to the
Board. In April 2001, the Board affirmed the Department's order
and Buffelen appealed the order to the Spokane County Superior
Court, requesting a jury trial.
|
| [17] |
At the conclusion of the trial, a majority of the jury decided
the Department incorrectly concluded Mr. Hendershot's flare-up
of his low back condition was proximately caused by his original
on-the-job injury in August 1985. As a result, Buffelen was
not required to reopen Mr. Hendershot's case. However, before
a final order was entered that reflected the jury's decision,
Mr. Hendershot filed a motion to dismiss Buffelen's appeal to
the superior court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Mr. Hendershot claimed the trial had been held in the wrong
county according to the strict requirements of RCW 51.52.110,
which states in relevant part:
|
| [18] |
In cases involving injured workers, an appeal to the superior
court shall be to the superior court of the county of residence
of the worker or beneficiary, as shown by the department's records,
or to the superior court of the county wherein the injury occurred
or where neither the county of residence nor the county wherein
the injury occurred are in the state of Washington then the
appeal may be directed to the superior court for Thurston county.
|
| [19] |
(Emphasis added.) Applying the rule to the facts, Mr. Hendershot
argued he resided in Stevens County at the time the appeal was
filed and the original injury occurred in Pierce County. As
a result, Spokane County was not the proper court to hear the
appeal. The Department agreed with, and supported, Mr. Hendershot's
motion to dismiss. The reviewing court originally agreed with
Mr. Hendershot's position and granted the motion to dismiss.
Buffelen filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which was
later granted. In rendering its decision on reconsideration,
the trial court determined that Mr. Hendershot's address, as
listed in the Department records, was located in Spokane County.
Accordingly, it determined that pursuant to RCW 51.52.110, Spokane
County was an appropriate forum in which to commence the appeal
of the Board's decision. As a result, the jury verdict in Buffelen's
favor became the final order. Because he believed the reviewing
court had misinterpreted the statute, Mr. Hendershot filed this
timely notice of appeal.
|
| [20] |
Analysis
|
| [21] |
The sole issue on appeal is whether the superior court,
acting in its appellate capacity, erred when it granted Buffelen's
motion for reconsideration and upheld the jury's verdict. A
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lian v. Stalick, 106 Wn.
App. 811, 823-24, 25 P.3d 467 (2001). However, whether a particular
court has jurisdiction to hear a particular case is reviewed
de novo. Shoop v. Kittitas County, 149 Wn.2d 29, 33, 65 P.3d
1194 (2003).
|
| [22] |
The Industrial Insurance Act grants to the Department original
jurisdiction over cases involving injured workers. RCW 51.04.010.
It provides the superior court of this state with appellate
jurisdiction. RCW 51.52.110; Dougherty, 150 Wn.2d at 314. As
noted by the Dougherty court, '{v}enue and jurisdiction are
distinct concepts.' Dougherty, 150 Wn.2d at 315. Venue, a procedural
issue, connotes locality, whereas jurisdiction indicates the
power of a court to decide a case on its merits. Id. at 316.
Statutes like RCW 51.52.110, which require an action to be brought
in specific counties, are generally interpreted as merely identifying
the proper venue. Id. They do not, however, limit the jurisdiction
of the state courts to the counties set forth in the statute.
Id.; Shoop, 149 Wn.2d at 37.
|
| [23] |
The Dougherty court applied these principles to RCW 51.52.110
and concluded the statute established the appellate jurisdiction
of the superior courts and also designated the proper venue
if such an appeal was filed. Dougherty, 150 Wn.2d at 316. The
court then distinguished subject matter jurisdiction by reiterating
that it 'refers to the authority of a court to adjudicate a
particular type {the nature of a case and type of relief sought}
of controversy,' rather than a particular case. Id. at 317.
The Dougherty court determined that if one superior court had
the authority to hear an appeal from a Board decision there
was no 'jurisdictional' reason why another superior court could
not also hear the same appeal since all superior courts in this
state have the same authority to adjudicate the same types of
controversies. Id. The court clearly rejected 'the theory that
subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court varies from
county to county' particularly as applied to industrial insurance
appeals. Id.
|
| [24] |
Applying the law set forth in Dougherty to the facts of
the case before us, the trial court's decision to deny Mr. Hendershot's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was
proper, although not for the reason stated. Whether the appeal
could have been filed in Stevens County is a venue issue not
a jurisdictional one. Accordingly, we decline to address the
issue of whether venue was proper in Spokane County since Mr.
Hendershot's motion to dismiss does not address venue.
|
| [25] |
Affirmed.
|
| [26] |
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion
will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but
it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
|
| [27] |
WE CONCUR:
|
| [28] |
Kato, A.C.J.
|
| [29] |
Sweeney, J.
|
|
|
|
