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Buffelen Woodworking v. Hendershot, 119 Wash.App. 1048 (Wash.App.Div.3 12/16/2003)


[1]     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Division Three Panel Four
[2]     No. 20999-7-III
[3]     2003.WA.0001830< http://www.versuslaw.com>
[4]     December 16, 2003
[5]     BUFFELEN WOODWORKING, RESPONDENT,
v.
DAVID HENDERSHOT, APPELLANT, STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, DEFENDANT.
[6]     SOURCE OF APPEAL Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County Docket No: 01-2-02946-5 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 03/11/2002
[7]     Counsel OF Record
[8]     Counsel for Appellant(s) Frank Louis Cikutovich Stiley & Cikutovich 1408 W Broadway Ave Spokane, WA 99201-1902
[9]     Counsel for Defendant(s) Gervais Ward III McAuliffe Ofc of Attorney General 1116 W Riverside Ave Spokane, WA 99201-1106
[10]    Counsel for Respondent(s) D. Jeffrey Burnham Johnson Graffe Keay Moniz & Wick Llp 925 4th Ave Ste 2300 Seattle, WA 98104
[11]    The opinion of the court was delivered by: Schultheis, J.
[12]   
Concurring: Dennis J. Sweeney, Kenneth H. Kato
[13]    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
[14]    David Hendershot, an employee of Buffelen Woodworking, appeals the court's order on reconsideration regarding his industrial insurance claim. He contends the Spokane County Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the employer's appeal after a favorable ruling regarding his industrial insurance claim. This opinion was stayed pending the outcome of a Supreme Court case, Dougherty v. Department of Labor and Industries, 150 Wn.2d 310, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003), which is determinative to our decision in this appeal. The Dougherty court determined the requirements regarding the location of the proper court in which to file an appeal from a decision of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, as set forth in RCW 51.52.110, relate to venue, not jurisdiction. Id. at 313. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order on reconsideration, which had the effect of denying Mr. Hendershot's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We also grant Buffelen's motion to strike Mr. Hendershot's response brief.
[15]    Facts
[16]    In August 1985, while working at Buffelen, Mr. Hendershot sustained an injury to his lumbar spine. He filed an industrial insurance claim with Buffelen, who was self-insured. The claim was accepted and Buffelen provided benefits during the periods of time Mr. Hendershot was unable to work. Buffelen also paid Mr. Hendershot's medical expenses. Buffelen closed the claim in December 1992, with Mr. Hendershot receiving a permanent partial disability award for low back impairment. In August 1998, Mr. Hendershot filed an application to reopen his claim, which was denied by Buffelen. Approximately one year later, the Department of Labor and Industries ordered Buffelen to reopen Mr. Hendershot's claim. Buffelen appealed the decision to the Board. In April 2001, the Board affirmed the Department's order and Buffelen appealed the order to the Spokane County Superior Court, requesting a jury trial.
[17]    At the conclusion of the trial, a majority of the jury decided the Department incorrectly concluded Mr. Hendershot's flare-up of his low back condition was proximately caused by his original on-the-job injury in August 1985. As a result, Buffelen was not required to reopen Mr. Hendershot's case. However, before a final order was entered that reflected the jury's decision, Mr. Hendershot filed a motion to dismiss Buffelen's appeal to the superior court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Hendershot claimed the trial had been held in the wrong county according to the strict requirements of RCW 51.52.110, which states in relevant part:
[18]    In cases involving injured workers, an appeal to the superior court shall be to the superior court of the county of residence of the worker or beneficiary, as shown by the department's records, or to the superior court of the county wherein the injury occurred or where neither the county of residence nor the county wherein the injury occurred are in the state of Washington then the appeal may be directed to the superior court for Thurston county.
[19]    (Emphasis added.) Applying the rule to the facts, Mr. Hendershot argued he resided in Stevens County at the time the appeal was filed and the original injury occurred in Pierce County. As a result, Spokane County was not the proper court to hear the appeal. The Department agreed with, and supported, Mr. Hendershot's motion to dismiss. The reviewing court originally agreed with Mr. Hendershot's position and granted the motion to dismiss. Buffelen filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which was later granted. In rendering its decision on reconsideration, the trial court determined that Mr. Hendershot's address, as listed in the Department records, was located in Spokane County. Accordingly, it determined that pursuant to RCW 51.52.110, Spokane County was an appropriate forum in which to commence the appeal of the Board's decision. As a result, the jury verdict in Buffelen's favor became the final order. Because he believed the reviewing court had misinterpreted the statute, Mr. Hendershot filed this timely notice of appeal.
[20]    Analysis
[21]    The sole issue on appeal is whether the superior court, acting in its appellate capacity, erred when it granted Buffelen's motion for reconsideration and upheld the jury's verdict. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lian v. Stalick, 106 Wn. App. 811, 823-24, 25 P.3d 467 (2001). However, whether a particular court has jurisdiction to hear a particular case is reviewed de novo. Shoop v. Kittitas County, 149 Wn.2d 29, 33, 65 P.3d 1194 (2003).
[22]    The Industrial Insurance Act grants to the Department original jurisdiction over cases involving injured workers. RCW 51.04.010. It provides the superior court of this state with appellate jurisdiction. RCW 51.52.110; Dougherty, 150 Wn.2d at 314. As noted by the Dougherty court, '{v}enue and jurisdiction are distinct concepts.' Dougherty, 150 Wn.2d at 315. Venue, a procedural issue, connotes locality, whereas jurisdiction indicates the power of a court to decide a case on its merits. Id. at 316. Statutes like RCW 51.52.110, which require an action to be brought in specific counties, are generally interpreted as merely identifying the proper venue. Id. They do not, however, limit the jurisdiction of the state courts to the counties set forth in the statute. Id.; Shoop, 149 Wn.2d at 37.
[23]    The Dougherty court applied these principles to RCW 51.52.110 and concluded the statute established the appellate jurisdiction of the superior courts and also designated the proper venue if such an appeal was filed. Dougherty, 150 Wn.2d at 316. The court then distinguished subject matter jurisdiction by reiterating that it 'refers to the authority of a court to adjudicate a particular type {the nature of a case and type of relief sought} of controversy,' rather than a particular case. Id. at 317. The Dougherty court determined that if one superior court had the authority to hear an appeal from a Board decision there was no 'jurisdictional' reason why another superior court could not also hear the same appeal since all superior courts in this state have the same authority to adjudicate the same types of controversies. Id. The court clearly rejected 'the theory that subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court varies from county to county' particularly as applied to industrial insurance appeals. Id.
[24]    Applying the law set forth in Dougherty to the facts of the case before us, the trial court's decision to deny Mr. Hendershot's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper, although not for the reason stated. Whether the appeal could have been filed in Stevens County is a venue issue not a jurisdictional one. Accordingly, we decline to address the issue of whether venue was proper in Spokane County since Mr. Hendershot's motion to dismiss does not address venue.
[25]    Affirmed.
[26]    A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
[27]    WE CONCUR:
[28]    Kato, A.C.J.
[29]    Sweeney, J.